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PROPERTY RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: A CRITICAL APPROACH 
ENRIQUE BOONE BARRERA* 
Abstract: The treaty-based regime of investment protection is said to protect 
the property rights of foreign investors. Arbitral tribunals are usually tasked 
with settling investment disputes using principles of international law, some of 
which refer to the doctrine of protection of aliens. These features have led 
some commentators to compare the protection of foreign investment with the 
protection of property rights by human rights instruments and courts. This Es-
say provides a critical perspective on the relationship between these two sys-
tems. The Essay re-examines the widespread assumptions that underlie efforts 
to find parallels between human rights and foreign investment protection. The 
analysis reveals that even when investment tribunals protect property rights, 
they do so within the narrow confines of a monetary dispute. Substantive trea-
ty provisions, as interpreted by arbitral tribunals, cannot be placed in the tradi-
tion of the protection of aliens, but rather in the efforts of developed countries 
to entrench the Hull formula. Furthermore, after examining the distinct ap-
proaches to the protection of property rights by arbitral tribunals and human 
rights courts, this Essay concludes that the narrow goals of international in-
vestment agreements are fundamentally different from those pursued by hu-
man rights instruments. 
INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
dismissed an investor claim because the claimant and the subject matter 
were the same as those of a case that an arbitral tribunal had already set-
tled.1 Is the fact, however, that similar claims can be submitted to two dif-
ferent dispute settlement institution𝑠𝑠—one specialized in the protection of 
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 1 Le Bridge Corp. Ltd. S.R.L. v. Republic of Moldova, App. No. 48027/10, ¶ 33 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R., Apr. 19, 2018) (finding that the claim brought before the court was the same in substance 
and brought by the same complainant as a prior proceeding in an arbitral tribunal, even though in 
the first proceeding the claim was brought on behalf of the complainant’s company and the second 
claim was brought on his own behalf as an investor). 
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foreign investment and the other a human rights court—sufficient to con-
clude that both regimes are also similar? The two systems evolved from 
very distinct historical circumstances, and yet there is enough overlap in 
terminology to merit a closer examination of their relationship. In particular, 
international investment tribunals have borrowed terminology that histori-
cally has been used in the context of protecting aliens and, later, in human 
rights discourse. The protection of property rights is considered to be the 
bedrock of international investment protection. In his well-known exchang-
es with his Mexican counterpart, Secretary of State Cordell Hull claimed 
that “no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever 
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment 
therefor.”2 It was probably difficult for Hull to realize how culturally de-
pendent his reverence for private property was.3 The idea that there was a 
universally accepted principle that reflected such a stance was more of an 
aspiration than a reality. There is not now, and there never has been, such a 
principle.4 In fact, few propositions in law are more contested, and yet more 
widespread, than the absolute precedence of private property rights, even in 
the United States.5 In spite of this fact, the Mexican and American govern-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 478–79 (2d ed. 2008) 
(emphasis added) (providing an excerpt from a letter from Secretary Hull to the Mexican Ambas-
sador to the United States dated August 22, 1938). 
 3 In Mexico, private property rights are subject to limitations imposed by the constitution. Id. 
at 472. Some cultures, however, have even more idiosyncratic approaches to property. See Carol 
M. Rose, Invasions, Innovation, Environment, in HERNANDO DE SOTO AND PROPERTY IN A MAR-
KET ECONOMY 21, 31–33 (D. Benjamin Barros ed., 2010) (describing the “complex mixtures” of 
traditional approaches of property and modernist understandings of property). Furthermore, in 
some societies, property rights are associated with political, social, and even spiritual norms. LO-
RENZO COTULA, HUMAN RIGHTS, NATURAL RESOURCE AND INVESTMENT LAW IN A GLOBAL-
ISED WORLD: SHADES OF GREY IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW 11 (2012). 
 4 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 481. Although Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Pardell argue 
that, by the 1900s, American and European international lawyers agreed that a minimum standard 
of justice in the treatment foreigners existed, it should be noted that it was still nascent, and lacked 
the rather exacting features that Hull accorded to his principle of unconditional and prompt com-
pensation. Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Historical Development of Investment Treaty 
Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 1, 11 
(Kluwer Law Int’l eds., 2009). The most memorable description of this agreement between all 
“civilized nations” is by Nobel Prize winner Elihu Root in 1910, who described a “very simple, 
very fundamental” standard of justice that all domestic legislation must meet. Jan Wouters, 
Sanderijn Duquet & Nicolas Hachez, International Investment Law: The Perpetual Search for 
Consensus, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 25, 27–28 (Oliver De Schutter, Johan 
Swinnen & Jan Wouters eds., 2013). 
 5 For a communitarian critique of private property rights, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Bound-
aries and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 162, 182 (Robert Post ed., 
1991); see also Jeremy Waldron, Property, Justification and Need, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 185, 185 
(1993). John Rawls argued that the precise content of private property rights could vary from 
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ments reached an agreement in 1938 on the settlement of agrarian and oil 
claims, but they did not reach an agreement regarding what constituted the 
law.6 This is not just a historical anecdote, but rather is symptomatic of the 
different perspectives on the nature and reach of investment protection 
measures to this day. 
If proven that international investment law (“IIL”) ultimately advances 
human rights, it would be one of the strongest arguments for the belea-
guered regime of investment protection. Since the neo-liberal craze of the 
1990s that helped spread international investment agreements (“IIAs”) 
throughout the world faded, there have been renewed efforts to justify the 
current system of investment protection.7 Justifications for the IIL regime 
have varied through time. Initially, the justification was the protection of a 
basic principle of international law that required “prompt, adequate, effec-
tive” compensation for foreign investors.8 The exact meaning and extent of 
such a principle, however, has always been contested, making it an odd 
foundation for a regime of international law that imposes penalties.9 The 
justification then shifted to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens 
(“MST”), which was supposed to root IIL in customary international law. 
The relationship between the MST and IIL, however, has been uneasy, par-
ticularly when used to determine when and how much compensation should 
be paid after expropriation. That was never the purpose of the MST as es-
tablished in L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States 
and B.E. Chattin (United States) v. United Mexican States.10 Although there 
seems to be agreement that the standard set in those cases has evolved, there 
is no agreement regarding the new meaning of the MST.11 At the same time, 
proponents of IIL have relied on more utilitarian justifications, arguing that 
                                                                                                                           
society to society. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 114–15 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2003). 
 6 LOWENFELD, supra note 2 at 476, 479–81; Wouters et al., supra note 4 at 29. 
 7 JOSÉ A. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATION-
AL INVESTMENT 132–33 (2011). 
 8 Id. at 98. 
 9 See LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 481–82 (describing the increasing skepticism among 
Western scholars regarding the extent of the principle’s application). 
 10 B.E. Chattin (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 282, 295 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Cl. 
Comm’n 1927) (finding that Mexican proceedings against an American did not sufficiently meet 
international standards); L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 
R.I.A.A. 60, 62 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926) (denying an American claim for compensa-
tion following the death of an American, and stating that the Commission was not prepared to find 
that the Mexican authorities showed any “lack of diligence” in their investigation to warrant liabil-
ity for Mexico). 
 11 Enrique Boone Barrera, The Case for Removing the Fair and Equitable Treatment Stand-
ard from NAFTA 7 (CIGI Papers No. 128, Apr. 2007), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Paper%20no.128web_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4YL-T2KJ]. 
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IIAs attract foreign investment.12 This too is controversial as an unqualified 
statement. Linking human rights to IIL could be the last justification to en-
trench an international system of protection for foreign investment. 
The objective of this Essay is to re-examine the arguments that under-
pin the notion that IIL and human rights are similar systems. In order to ac-
complish this, Part I will revisit the historical account of IIL as a holistic 
system designed to facilitate the progress of all nations.13 Part II has two 
objectives: first, analyze the three main approaches to property rights as 
human rights in IIL and, second, analyze the concept of property in IIL and 
in human rights instruments.14 Cases from both regimes are also contrasted 
to flesh out their main differences. 
I. PATH DEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
The most controversial aspect of IIL is the system of investor-state ar-
bitration (“ISA”). As a response to critics, some scholars have pointed out 
that it is precisely states themselves that, exercising their sovereign powers, 
have chosen to subject themselves to ISA.15 This is, of course, technically 
true, but it ignores how the regime of international investment protection 
evolved in a context of decolonization efforts by developing countries and 
of power imbalances during treaty negotiations.16 The fact that economic 
                                                                                                                           
 12 JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 166 (2017) [hereinafter BONNITCHA 
ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY] (concluding that there is a large and growing literature suggesting 
that IIAs have some impact on investment decisions in some circumstances); Lauge N. Skovgaard 
Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: 
Revisiting the Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 2009–2010, at 539, 
546 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010) (discussing the difficulty to ascertain the exact effects of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties). 
 13 See infra notes 15–49 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 50–157 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Charles N. Brower & Stephen W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legit-
imacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 490 (2009); see also ALVAREZ, 
supra note 7, at 368–69 (noting that states are asserting sovereignty as opposed to rejecting it by 
participating in ISAs); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 
1591 (2005) (arguing that because states chose to enter investment treaties, these treaties “do not 
trespass unnecessarily on sovereignty”). 
 16 See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of 
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 476 (2008) (stating that “[l]arge-scale 
nationalizations often stemmed [from developing countries’] decolonization”); see also Isabel 
Feichtner, International (Investment) Law and Distribution Conflicts Over Natural Resources, in 
BRIDGING THE GAP 256, 260 (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hoffman eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter BRIDGING THE GAP] (discussing how decolonization has led to conflicting positions 
between industrialized and developing countries, particularly surrounding permanent sovereignty 
over national resources); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and In-
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channels now flow in many directions and all countries are exposed to ISA 
has triggered a strong reaction from developed countries.17 This speaks vol-
umes about whether a genuine exercise of state sovereignty would have 
produced the same sort of treaties that were effected well into the 1990s.18 
This is not an earth-shattering revelation, and yet the gradual omission of 
this history has allowed alternative narratives to take hold about the emer-
gence of the regime of investment protection. 
The notion that international investment protection is a guarantor of 
human rights is based on a particular narrative about how and why IIL 
emerged in the first place. José Alvarez, for instance, argued that Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (“BITs”) “were . . . designed to support the national and 
international rule of law . . . .”19 Furthermore, he went on to say that “[t]o 
the extent investor-state decisions elaborate on concepts such as ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’, they may be engaging in the same enterprise as inter-
national courts engaged in interpreting human rights.”20 Indeed, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (“FET”) is related to the MST, which in turn is 
associated with protecting a foreigner’s most basic of human rights. Of 
course, the international investment regime protects only one type of human 
right, namely, property rights. Alvarez pointed out, however, that “protect-
ing the rights of investors may sometimes be hard to distinguish from pro-
tecting their human rights.”21 As a result, IIAs may, in some instances, im-
prove the rule of law, due process, freedom of expression, as well as protect 
                                                                                                                           
ternational Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 22–23 (2014) (arguing that IIAs were struc-
turally skewed in favor of capital-exporter countries). I use the term “regime” in the same way that 
Steven Ratner defines it: “[A] self-identified field of international law comprising norms to regu-
late a certain type of conduct and institutions to make decisions within it.” Ratner, supra, at 485. 
Some commentators argue that it is important to identify the different regimes of international 
investment with the “investment treaty regime.” BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra 
note 12, at 2–3 (emphasis added). 
 17 Ratner, supra note 16, at 514 (arguing that, in the NAFTA context, even though the U.S. 
and Canada believed that Mexico would be the target of investment provisions, claims against 
those two countries have given them a strong interest in lessening the asymmetry of IIAs); Thom-
as Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-
Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1155–56 
(2014) (noting that their data shows that investors from developing countries hardly ever file arbi-
tration claims against developed countries); Wagner, supra note 16, at 23–24 (stating that devel-
oped states must defend their actions before arbitral tribunals with more frequency now that capi-
tal flows are not unidirectional). 
 18 In fact, the use of international arbitration in the early days was accompanied by fears of 
military intervention. James T. Gathii, War’s Legacy in International Investment Law, 11 INT’L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 353, 358 (2009). 
 19 ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 378. 
 20 Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 
 21 Id. at 381. 
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against government violence.22 The same has been said about foreign direct 
investment and human rights in general.23 
As described in the introduction, history supports the idea that IIAs 
were designed to protect the economic interests of investors in developing 
countries, not that they were fashioned to advance the rule of law. Further-
more, the line connecting economic development, human rights, and the 
current system of ISA is far from straight—if it exists at all. The system of 
international investment protection that developed countries advanced as 
reflective of fundamental principles of justice, was anything but. To state 
the obvious, merely invoking a principle of international law does not make 
any measure just. The French, for instance, argued that they were defending 
“principles of universal justice” when they attacked Argentina from 1838 to 
1840 to obtain privileges for their citizens.24 Great Britain, for its part, “in-
tervened in Latin American at least forty times from 1820 to 1840.”25 
More importantly, Ha-Joon Chang has observed that even if the United 
States and European Union states have been proposing investment liberali-
zation as the path to prosperity, “during their early stages of development, 
now-developed countries systematically discriminated between domestic 
and foreign investors in their industrial policy.”26 Chang argued that devel-
oped countries themselves did not believe, particularly in the early stages of 
development, that it was a good idea to surrender large parts of the econo-
my to foreign interests.27 The effects of ISA on policymaking are not entire-
ly understood, but they could be significant.28 Although some scholars have 
argued that international investment tribunals do not ask states to repeal 
measures found in violation of an IIA, as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) does, asking states, particularly developing countries, to compensate 
foreign investors could have the same effect.29 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 378–82. 
 23 Julian Scheu, Trust Building, Balancing, and Sanctioning: Three Pillars of a Systematic 
Approach to Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
449, 454–55 (2017). 
 24 Alexis Mourre, Perspectives of International Arbitration in Latin America, 17 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 597, 597 (2006). 
 25 Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 4, at 9. 
 26 Ha-Joon Chang, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective, 16 EUR. J. 
DEV. RES. 687, 688 (2004). This Essay will not dwell on the problematic nature of the notion of 
discrimination based on comparing foreign investors with “the most-favored domestic investors.” 
For information on this issue, see JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW: CONVERGING SYSTEMS 79–135 (2016). 
 27 Chang, supra note 26, at 693 (citing the United States as an example).  
 28 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 168–71. 
 29 See ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 55 (describing the policy consideration of “vindication” 
rendered by ISAs). 
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It may be true, as Alvarez argued, that some of the claims of individual 
investors might be similar to human rights cases.30 But that may be the ex-
tent to which the two systems resemble. How an arbitral tribunal processes 
such a claim and the way that principles of international law are applied is 
strikingly different for each system. According to Steven Ratner, this may 
be because the institutional inertias of each regime are different and “insti-
tutions continually make decisions oriented toward advancing the goals of 
the regime, not the goals of other regimes.”31 The regime of international 
investment protection did not emerge to protect human rights, but rather to 
shield the economic interests of foreign investors from developed countries 
by curtailing the ability of host states to interfere with them.32 Again, this 
commentary notes nothing extraordinary, but this history still needs empha-
sizing. 
The disconnect between rhetoric and reality does not mean that the re-
gime of international investment protection always had the narrow objec-
tives that it has now. In fact, an examination of the evolution of the Ameri-
can codification of investment protection measures shows a balanced ap-
proach in which the well-being of the host country was an important con-
sideration for the long-term sustainability of American exports.33 The first 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties (“FCNs”) recognized that 
the success of an investment depended on the prosperity of the host coun-
try.34 Some scholars considered these initial FCNs to be a more holistic and 
a more suitable way of protecting investments than narrower approaches.35 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Alvarez did recognize some differences between the two systems, which he mostly identi-
fied as procedural. Id. at 66–67. In terms of property rights, however, he acknowledged that there 
were differences regarding how it may be interpreted under human rights and investment treaties. 
He concluded, however, saying that: “[I]nvestors’ rights to legitimate expectations in their proper-
ty may be the most effectively protected ‘human’ right that there is . . . .” Id. at 74. 
 31 Ratner, supra note 16, at 485. 
 32 See Melaku Geboye Desta, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and International Invest-
ment Law: The Elusive Search for Equilibrium, in BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 16, at 223, 227 
(stating that the use of international arbitration insulates the investment from local law and domes-
tic courts); see also Moshe Hirsch, Investment Tribunal and Human Rights Treaties: A Sociologi-
cal Perspective, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPEC-
TIVES 85, 93 (Freya Baetens ed., 2013) (explaining that investment lawyers usually emphasize 
market economy ideology while human rights lawyers emphasize the primacy of human rights 
over all other international legal rules) [hereinafter INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES]. 
 33 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: U.S. POSTWAR 
FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 37–38 (2017). 
 34 Id. at 196. 
 35 See id. (noting that the United States favored the FCN because it “addressed matters other 
than investment, such as trade or the personal rights of individuals”). 
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In the 1980s, however, the American business community had grown 
unhappy with FCNs.36 Ronald Reagan decided to move from the FCN to 
the BIT model and, by 1982, the United Sates had signed its first BIT with 
Egypt.37 According to Wolfgang Alschner, American BITs integrated some 
of the elements of the FCN model, but again, they were only investment 
related and mostly aimed at increasing the scope of investment protection.38 
Gone with the FCNs was an approach to investment protection that strived 
for a balance between certainty for investors and the responsibility of states 
to regulate in sensitive areas.39 Developing countries mostly felt the effects 
of such a shift.40 This was no surprise; commentators at the time understood 
the different nature of the BITs and never considered the possibility that 
these treaties could possibly be used against a developed nation.41 The dis-
parity in power between capital exporting countries and host countries 
heavily influenced the evolution IIL. 
From this brief historical recounting, we can conclude two things: 
(1) that the regime of international investment protection did not emerge to 
protect human rights, but rather to protect the economic interests of devel-
oped countries, and (2) that the features of ISA are not a sign of “immaturi-
ty” of the regime of international investment protection, but its raison 
d’être. 42 The entire purpose of ISA tribunals was to insulate the investor 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Wolfgang Alschner, Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties in Modern Investment Treaty Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT’L L. 455, 463 (2013) (noting that in the 1970s and 1980s the differences between FCN and 
BIT became clear, and that the U.S. business community began to favor BIT); see also BONNI-
TCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 190 (explaining that in response to the 
“halt” of the FCN, business groups set up BIT). 
 37 Alschner, supra note 36, at 464. 
 38 Id. at 468–74. 
 39 Id. at 465. 
 40 Given that FCNs required reciprocity, any attempt to curtail the ability of a state to regulate 
would have had an effect on all parties. But once all other considerations were stripped from the 
treaties, with only the protection of capital standing, the effects of BITs became one-sided and 
mostly affected capital importing countries. Id. 
 41 Id. at 466. 
 42 Anthea Roberts, for instance, explained the trajectory of the regime of international invest-
ment protection in three stages: infancy, adolescence, and the forthcoming adulthood. Anthea 
Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 
AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 75 (2013). In its infancy, IIL was a system dominated by the developed coun-
tries’ interests that led arbitrators to emphasize its roots in commercial arbitration and a narrow 
human rights approach. This narrow human rights approach led tribunals to favor the investors’ 
interests and conceive the protection of economic interests on a par of human rights. In the second 
stage that Roberts described, the “teenage years” so to speak, states are recalibrating investment 
protection and the public interest. See id. at 75–93 (describing the course of an investment treaty 
system, and equating it to a life cycle). 
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from the laws and courts of the host country.43 This history also explains 
why it has been so difficult for arbitral tribunals to consider principles of 
human rights; that was never the purpose of IIL.44 An argument could be 
made that this section reflects the past, but that it has become irrelevant 
with the recent reform efforts aimed at making the regime more responsive 
to public concerns. 
The history of the regime of international investment protection still 
influences its development today. The frequent reliance of tribunals on 
precedent makes its progress highly path dependent.45 As explained above, 
a regime is designed to advance its own objectives over others.46 In ISA, the 
objective is to protect foreign investors above all else.47 This narrow focus, 
in part, explains why ISA has become more isolated and controversial than 
the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. Jürgen Kurtz credited the stability 
of the WTO process to the fact that “the commitment to trade liberalization 
was always counter-balanced by mechanisms to ensure domestic stability 
and the pursuit by members of core public values.”48 This, he continued, is 
in stark contrast to what happens in ISA.49 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Desta, supra note 32. 
 44 See Hirsch, supra note 32, at 92 (explaining that the sociocultural distances between partic-
ular international legal branches can affect the inclination or disinclination of decision-makers to 
incorporate or reject legal rules developed in other branches of international law, and that the 
inclination or disinclination of investment tribunals to incorporate human rights is influenced by 
the sociocultural distance between the two branches). 
 45 According to Oona Hathaway the concept of path dependence, when applied to law, refers 
to three main points: (1) the reproduction of similar patterns; (2) the self-reinforcing processes of 
an institution; and (3) the importance of early events in determining further events; that is, that 
early events “lock-in” a system in particular pattern. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the 
Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 
628–631 (2001). Even though this analysis was about common law in general, it also applies to 
ISA given what Moshe Hirsch has called the “formal rejection and de facto acceptance of prece-
dent.” Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 143, 158 (Zachary Doug-
las, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñueles eds., 2014) [hereinafter BRINGING THEORY INTO PRAC-
TICE]. 
 46 Ratner, supra note 16, at 485. 
 47 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 11 (stating that rapid spread of 
IIAs was mainly due to the desire to attract foreign investment, rather than strengthening interna-
tional institutions or the protection of property rights). 
 48 KURTZ, supra note 26, at 171. 
 49 Id. 
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
We can say with a great degree of certainty that IIL did not develop to 
support the international rule of law nor to protect human rights. If any-
thing, history shows a systematic attempt to remove broader public con-
cerns from IIAs.50 Furthermore, IIL creates legal anomalies by providing 
foreign investors with substantive and procedural legal advantages over 
domestic investors in similar circumstances.51 Hardly the definition of rule 
of law. On the other hand, what about the protection of property rights? IIL 
protects the rights of investors in relation to their property. This does not 
mean that IIAs only deal with strict violations of property rights. As Alvarez 
points out, other forms of interference with the investors’ rights are also 
addressed.52 Crucially, though, an IIA is breached only to the extent that 
such violations also affect an investment. For instance, when it comes to the 
FET clause in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 
1105 extends this protection to the “investments of investors,” and not to 
the investors themselves.53 In this sense, investment law protects the eco-
nomic interests of investors. Human rights law, on the other hand, protects 
basic rights that are necessary for human dignity and prosperity. Section A 
will cover the three main arguments made by other scholars to argue that 
the approach to property rights under the international investment regime is 
similar to the human rights approach.54 Section B will analyze human rights 
case law and compare it to cases from arbitral tribunals.55 
A. Three Approaches to the Protection of Property Rights as  
Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration 
Even if history does not support the notion that the regime of treaty-
based protection of foreign investment emerged to protect human rights, it 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See generally David Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to the 
Standards of Civilised Justice?, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 60 (2014) (explaining that early 
formulations of diplomatic protection of aliens, and contemporary ILL, is based on a single stand-
ard of civilized justice). 
 51 As Lorenzo Cotula puts it: “A fundamental pillar of human rights law is the principle of 
equality in the enjoyment of human rights, which is embodied in all major human rights treaties.” 
Lorenzo Cotula, International Law and Negotiating Power in Foreign Investment Projects: Com-
paring Property Rights Protection under Human Rights and Investment Law in Africa, 33 S. AFR. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 62, 95 (2008). 
 52 ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 378–82. 
 53 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 
639 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 54 See infra notes 56–96 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 97–157 and accompanying text. 
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could be argued that it does nonetheless. This section analyzes the three 
main approaches that have been used to justify such account. These ap-
proaches follow an analysis of the practice of arbitral tribunals, which inter-
pret and apply IIAs. It is in this context that some commentators have found 
parallels between the two regimes. 
1. The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens as the Origin of 
International Investment Law 
The argument that the MST is the origin of IIL is similar to the histori-
cal justification of IIL as an expression of human rights; the main difference 
is that it goes to the substantive basis for the claim. The standards contained 
in IIAs have a pedigree that, in some cases, go back for centuries, which 
makes them part of customary international law. This view was expressed 
by Hull and, even before him, by Elihu Root.56 There are several scholars 
who have looked into the relationship between customary international law 
and the standards contained in IIAs and, in particular, regarding the MST.57 
The main goal of this section, however, is to demonstrate that even if it 
were the case that such relationship existed, the main analysis should con-
centrate on whether they are actually being applied as such by arbitral tri-
bunals, and whether they are suitable for ISA proceedings. 
Several commentators have observed that the protection of foreign in-
vestment is related to the MST. According to Francisco Francioni, “[d]enial 
of justice lies at the heart of the development of international law on the 
treatment of aliens and of foreign investment.”58 In the same vein, Pierre-
Marie Dupuy argues that: 
[I]n terms of historical origins if not precise date of birth, the in-
ternational protection of foreign investments clearly preceded the 
recognition at the international level of fundamental rights. This 
is merely due to the fact that customary international law relating 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Wouters et al., supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 57 See, e.g., PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE FORMATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF RULES OF CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 61–67 (2016) (describing 
the origin of MST); José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17 (2009) 
(discussing the relationship between BITs and custom, and noting the minimum guarantees in 
BITs); Campbell McLachlan, Is There an Evolving Customary International Law on Investment?, 
31 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. REV. 257 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siw015 
[https://perma.cc/LZ4M-P9GK] (observing the relationship between investment treaties and cus-
tom, and specifically noting the function of the MST). 
 58 Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment 
Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 63, 63 (Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2009) [hereinafter HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW]. 
2646 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2635 
to the protection of citizens abroad or the parallel establishment 
of international customary obligations incumbent on the territorial 
state to protect alien property had already crystallized at the turn 
of the twentieth century, if not even a little earlier.59 
Other authors have made similar observations.60 It is important to go over 
this argument carefully as there are several ways of interpreting it depend-
ing on how it is phrased. There are three main claims related to the MST 
and IIL that are important to unpack: (1) there are historical antecedents of 
protection of foreign investment that were prior to the development of hu-
man rights; (2) these historical antecedents gave rise to the MST; and (3) 
the MST is at the heart of IIL.  
a. There Are Historical Antecedents of Protection of Foreign Investment 
Which Were Prior to the Development of Human Rights 
The claim that there were instances of protection of foreign investment 
prior to human rights is fairly uncontroversial, although it should be noted 
that this says nothing about the relationship between the two concepts.61 
There were many unrelated legal developments prior to the development of 
human rights. Furthermore, the fact that there were historical instances of 
protection of foreign investment, and that today we have a system of treaty-
based protection of foreign investment, is insufficient to draw a direct link 
between the two developments.62 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather Than Fragmentation of International Law? The 
Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 58, at 45, 47. 
 60 See ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 63 (observing the historical relationship between human 
rights and investment rights); BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 11 
(stating that “the notion that international law should guarantee foreign investors international 
minimum standards of treatment has a long history”); LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 469–94 (ex-
plaining the evolution of what responsibility host states have to foreign investors under customary 
international law). 
 61 Pierre-Marie Dupuy argued that “there is, from a conceptual point of view, a significant 
difference between the sets of rules governing respectively the protection of aliens and human 
rights.” Dupuy, supra note 59, at 47. Nevertheless, Dupuy argued that “the rights of aliens, includ-
ing their economic rights linked to property, can to a large extent be perceived as the precursors of 
human rights . . . .” Id. at 49. 
 62 See LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 469–70 (describing the initial understanding that the 
expropriation of foreign property required compensation). Andreas Lowenfeld himself was not 
clear about where this notion came from. See id. (noting that “it was not clear whether this under-
standing was derived from a general principle of law . . . or was unique to international law”). 
Even the articulation of the “international standard of civilized nations” by Elihu Root has been 
deemed problematic because of its vagueness and contradictions. MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 40 (2013). 
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b. These Historical Antecedents Gave Rise to the MST 
The idea that historical antecedents gave rise to the MST is a contro-
versial claim that, although repeated many times, has not been proven. 
There are historical accounts of protection of foreign investment that date 
back to the seventeenth century, or even as far back as the late Middle Ag-
es.63 Regardless of the point of departure, they are both mythical as the ba-
sis of the MST as is understood in arbitral tribunals. The goal here is not to 
refute these historical accounts, but instead to question their relevance in 
regards to how present-day arbitrators interpret the MST. 
The MST is usually tied to the seminal Neer case, which involved a 
criminal matter between private parties and not the protection of property.64 
Indeed, as Martins Paparinskis noted: “[s]ince the scope of a State’s obliga-
tion to preclude and punish mistreatment by non-State actors may plausibly 
be different from the obligation not to mistreat aliens itself, a generalization 
about the content of standard for a State’s conduct, including the protection 
of foreign investment, from such an atypical rule may be inaccurate.”65 
As a result, it is true, as Francioni argues, “access to justice is insepa-
rable from the ‘minimum standard of treatment of aliens.’”66 The main 
problem is that the doctrinal basis for the MST, as a reflection of customary 
international law, is of very little relevance for arbitral tribunals applying 
IIAs to protect foreign investment. There is no direct link between the pro-
tection of foreign property and the MST as customary international law. 
This is not to dispute that there may have been coincidences from a func-
tionalist perspective; however, no straight line linking the protection of for-
eign investment in the Middle Ages to the Neer case (which defines the 
MST as understood by arbitral tribunals) has been demonstrated. Further-
more, the MST itself has never been an adequate reference to support the 
expanded protections to foreign investors in IIAs. 
c. The MST Is at the Heart of IIL 
To the extent that the point of entry of the MST in ISA is the FET, it is 
not entirely clear that there is a direct link between the customary definition 
of the MST and the FET. The relationship between the FET and the MST is 
                                                                                                                           
 63 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 11; Francioni, supra note 58, 
at 63. 
 64 Neer, 4 R.I.A.A. at 62. 
 65 PAPARINSKIS, supra note 62, at 51. 
 66 Francioni, supra note 58, at 64. 
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controversial, and neither term is particularly self-explanatory.67 Some have 
argued that the FET itself is customary international law; however, few tri-
bunals have taken that position and there are no sufficient reasons to con-
sider it to be the case.68 Newer treaties have responded to these concerns by 
codifying what the FET may mean, explicitly incorporating elements of the 
denial of justice doctrine, and collapsing any remaining distinction between 
the FET and the MST.69 Nevertheless, the threshold to determine a violation 
of the MST in ISA is still a matter of controversy.70 
Finally, the idea that denial of justice is at the heart of IIL is also con-
troversial. As explained at the beginning of this Essay, what seemed to have 
propelled the current system of treaty-based protection of foreign invest-
ment was a notion among developed countries that foreign investors were 
entitled to a particular set of compensation rules.71 It was not, technically 
speaking, a matter of denial of justice that prompted the spread of IIAs. The 
real force behind the spread of IIAs was the entrenchment of the Hull for-
mula as a standard of international law, through mostly bilateral agree-
ments, after developed countries failed to do so at multilateral gatherings.72 
For the purposes of this Essay, we can conclude that yes, the MST is 
related to the protection of fundamental rights and that yes, these preceded 
human rights. However, the customary nature of this standard is not directly 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Boone Barrera, supra note 11, at 3 (noting the debate surrounding the relationship 
between MST and the FET). 
 68 See PATRICK DUMBERRY, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: ITS INTERACTION WITH THE 
MINIMUM STANDARD AND ITS CUSTOMARY STATUS 57–76 (2017) [hereinafter DUMBERRY, FAIR 
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT] (concluding that the FET standard is not customary international 
law, but rather a treaty-based standard of protection); Ioana Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW, supra note 58, at 310, 318 (stating that Judge Schewebel supports the existence of 
customary FET). 
 69 See Boone Barrera, supra note 11, at 8 (referencing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as 
an example of a treaty that incorporated these additional restrictions, and noting that the TPP 
failed). 
 70 For instance, the concept of legitimate expectations expands the scope of protection under 
the MST. See id. (noting that the concept of legitimate expectations lacks fundamental “criteria” 
and as such has to potential to erode “the boundaries of the FET”). 
 71 See supra notes 15–49 and accompanying text. This belief was not unanimous, however. 
Even in the United States there was skepticism about the primacy of the property rights of foreign 
investors. Writing in 1928, Frederick Sherwood Dunn noted that: “[t]o extend the rule of the invi-
olability of the property rights of aliens to cover all cases of expropriation without concurrent 
indemnity, regardless of whether such act is deemed to be a necessary step in the improvement of 
conditions of the native population, would seem to place a powerful obstacle in the way of social 
reform.” Frederick Sherwood Dunn, International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUM. 
L. REV. 166, 178 (1928). 
 72 See BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 122 (explaining that one 
of the functions of IIAs was to settle the rules of expropriation in favor of the Hull formula). 
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related to IIAs, and it does not inform the reasoning of arbitral tribunals.73 
The MST did not emerge to settle investment disputes, and tribunals have to 
resort to stretching the MST beyond recognition to justify awards relying on 
it.74 The current use of the MST clause by arbitral tribunals has not been 
successfully traced back to the early historical instances of the protection of 
foreign investment. 
2. Treaty-Based Protection of Foreign Investment as Functionally Similar to 
Protection of Human Rights 
IIAs can be seen as protecting human rights even if not considered a 
human rights instrument per se. This is because, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, IIAs claim to protect property rights, usually by upholding other 
principles such as access to justice and due process. John Sprankling, for 
instance, considered that IIAs codified “the traditional requirement of ade-
quate compensation,” thus internationally coordinating an alleged principle 
of customary law which had come under threat by various countries, mostly 
in the developing world.75 Thus, if IIL protects a customary international 
principle related to a human right—i.e. property rights—then it can be seen 
as functionally similar to a human rights instrument. 
The most typical articulation of this argument, however, involves tak-
ing certain elements of both regimes and comparing them. There is no ex-
press intention to say that both regimes are the same; the implication is that 
they are so similar that it is only superficial features that separate them.76 
So, for example, it has been argued that IIL is just one of the “investment 
disciplines,” along with human rights and diplomatic protection.77 Indeed, 
in this case, human rights courts are presented as a court of last resort while 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See DUMBERRY, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 68, at 62 (stating that 
arbitral tribunals have generally failed to prove the existence of customary rules). 
 74 Boone Barrera, supra note 11, at 6–7 (referencing Bilcon of Del. v. Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 346–351 (Mar. 17, 
2015) as an example of a tribunal expanding the MST); DUMBERRY, FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT, supra note 68, at 46 (noting that state conduct that would not have constituted a 
breach of the MST in the past, may in fact be a breach today). 
 75 John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461, 
481 (2012). 
 76 See, e.g., August Reinisch, The Rule of Law in International Investment Arbitration, in 
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RULE OF LAW IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, RESOURCES, INVESTMENT 
AND TRADE 291, 297 (Photini Pazartzis et al. eds., 2016) (analyzing what he considered to be the 
functional equivalence between human rights instruments and some arbitration rules). 
 77 Ursula Kriebaum, The Nature of Investment Disciplines, in BRINGING THEORY INTO PRAC-
TICE, supra note 45, at 45. 
2650 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2635 
ISA is the most effective way of protecting property rights.78 No distinction 
is made regarding whether all property rights violations can be equally con-
sidered human rights claims, or if arbitral tribunals could be considered as 
functionally similar to human rights courts. It has even been suggested that 
indigenous communities have protected their traditional rights invoking 
“the right to property, as used by foreign investors in FTAs and BITs.”79 
The crux of this argument is that the protections offered in IIAs may 
already be human rights, or that they “represent human rights in the mak-
ing.”80 That is, even if treaty-based investment protections are not technical-
ly human rights as of now, they are “human right-ish” enough that they 
function as such. As mentioned above, this was precisely the intention of 
IIAs: they were meant to entrench a particular notion of protection of for-
eign investment by force of repetition.81 In Section B, I address these asser-
tions against relevant human rights and arbitral cases.82 
3. International Investment Agreements as Instruments to Promote “Good 
Governance” and Development 
The third argument, that IIAs contain basic notions of due process and 
the rule of law so that their implementation and awareness promote good 
governance and development, is the weakest connection to human rights of 
the three.83 This argument was first made in relation to the perceived lack of 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 74 (noting that investment property rights have greater in-
ternational protection); Kriebaum, supra note 77, at 48 (noting that ILL contrast with human rights 
by seeking to protect “foreigners’ rights”). 
 79 Manuel Monteagudo, The Right to Property in Human Rights and Investment Law: A Latin 
American Perspective of an Unavoidable Connection 12 (SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation 
Project, Working Paper Series, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613890 [https://perma.cc/Z2KL-
M26R]. But see Christina Binder, Investment, Development and Indigenous Populations, in 
BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 16, at 423, 426 (“Indigenous rights that are most at risk in an in-
vestment-related context are thus land and resource rights as well as their right to cultural identity 
(and cultural heritage).”); Judith Levine, The Interaction of International Investment Arbitration 
and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note, 32 at 106, 
121 (stating that “(i)nvestment-treaty arbitration is not the most common forum for the airing of 
complaints on behalf of indigenous peoples about their treatment under standards of international 
law”). 
 80 Nicolas Klein, Human Rights and International Investment Law: Investment Protection as 
Human Right?, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 199, 206 (2012). 
 81 M. Sornarajah argued that the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, a written text adopted by the International Law Commission that attempts to 
codify rules of state responsibility, could have also been used to further the expansion of invest-
ment protection in conjunction with arbitral awards. M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 92–93 (2015). 
 82 See infra notes 97–157 and accompanying text. 
 83 See ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 59, 378–79 (noting the similarities between IIAs and human 
rights, and outlining the argument that the protection of investor’s rights means the protection of 
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adequate legal institutions of the host state—usually a developing country.84 
The argument later morphed to include developed countries themselves. 
IIAs were then seen as providing protection that foreign investors inherently 
lacked for no other reason than that they were foreign.85 The first iteration 
of this argument coincided with the lack of ISA cases against developed 
countries.86 The argument evolved, however, to accommodate the fact that 
ISA was being used against countries that saw themselves as already having 
a strong rule of law that needed no bypassing.87 
The connection to human rights in these arguments is tenuous, but it is 
still there. If investment arbitration promotes good governance domestical-
ly, then it could be said that it indirectly promotes human rights values such 
as due process. It is true that these protections are related just to the treat-
ment of the foreign investor regarding property rights, however, as Alvarez 
put it: “the social goal of those who conclude investment treaties—securing 
sustainable economic development—is itself important precisely because it 
enables human beings to flourish.”88 This author agrees with that sentiment, 
but still questions whether IIAs really pursue “human flourishing” using 
                                                                                                                           
human rights); Monteagudo, supra note 79, at 15 (arguing that there are distinct differences be-
tween investment rights and human rights). 
 84 David P. Fidler, The Return of the Standard of Civilization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137, 140–41 
(2001) (stating that the standard of civilization was a way of expanding Western civilization and 
protecting, among other things, the property of Western people); Schneiderman, supra note 50, at 
62 (arguing that a single vision of civilization informed early formulations of diplomatic protec-
tion of aliens and, later, contemporary IIL); Schultz & Dupont, supra note 17, at 1161 (explaining 
an account of investment arbitration that describes it as substituting for the rule of law of the host 
state). 
 85 See, e.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 118–19 (articulating a version of the obsolescing bar-
gaining model and arguing that this was the reason why developed countries pushed for IIAs); 
Armand de Mestral & Robin Morgan, Does Canadian Law Provide Remedies Equivalent to 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration?, in SECOND THOUGHTS: INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION BE-
TWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 155 (Armand de Mestral ed., 2017) [hereinafter INVESTOR 
STATE ARBITRATION] (arguing that most Chapter 11 cases would not have a remedy under Cana-
dian law); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing the Interna-
tional Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193, 200 (2001) (arguing that the 
same rules that apply to Mexico under Chapter 11 should apply to Canada and the U.S.). 
 86 See Schultz & Dupont, supra note 17, at 1162 (noting how in the mid-1990s more cases 
were filed against developed countries). 
 87 Armand de Mestral, Investor-State Arbitration between Developed Countries, in INVESTOR 
STATE ARBITRATION, supra note 85, at 29–30. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA) moves away from the idea that ISA is necessary between developed coun-
tries. The USMCA, which is meant to supersede NAFTA, proposes to remove ISA between Cana-
da and the United States. Even though ISA was left in place between the United States and Mexi-
co, the scope is more limited than in NAFTA’s Chapter 11. OFFICE OF THE U.S TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA AGREEMENT TEXT, ANNEX 14-D, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/14%20Investment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BR4-TT4H]. 
 88 ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 62. 
2652 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2635 
economic development as a means to an end, or if the protection of wealth 
has always been the end, in and of itself. As mentioned in Part I, history 
does not seem to support this lofty idea that IIAs emerged to promote hu-
man rights, rather than as a well-calculated attempt to create customary in-
ternational law regarding the protection of foreign investment.89 
Some have argued that ISA cannot be stacked against developing 
countries because investors do not have an overwhelming rate of success 
with their claims, and the fact that there are more developed versus devel-
oped country cases than developed versus developing country cases.90 To be 
sure, this argument does not necessarily deny the historical account de-
scribed at the beginning of this Essay, but instead asserts that the system has 
evolved in a different path.91 This claim can easily be addressed. First, as 
some commentators have observed, the win/lose record says nothing about 
the fairness of ISA.92 Second, the parameters used to assert that investors 
often do not win have been challenged.93 Third, it may be true that there are 
more ISA cases between developed countries; however, it is still very much 
the case that ISA is an instrument for investors from developed countries.94 
Finally, it is not much to say that in a system where only investors can initi-
ate claims they do not always win. 
It is important to emphasize that the remedy in ISA is monetary com-
pensation, not the removal of the offending measure.95 This is an odd mech-
anism to ensure the flourishing of all humanity. Furthermore, as Hull indi-
cated in his exchange with his Mexican counterpart, the treatment of locals 
was far from being in line with the concerns of the alleged international 
standard that he was advocating for.96 IIAs main concern are to deter the 
host state from interfering with foreign investors regardless of the cause, 
                                                                                                                           
 89 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 200. 
 90 Susan D. Franck, International Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why, 7 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 3 (2009); Schultz & Dupont, supra note 17, at 1151, 1156. 
 91 Schultz & Dupont, supra note 17, at 1156.  
 92 ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 390; BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, 
at 26. 
 93 Howard Mann, ISDS: Who Wins More, Investors or States?, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., INV. TREATY NEWS (June 2015), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/itn-
breaking-news-june-2015-isds-who-wins-more-investors-or-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J8Z-FXXW]. 
 94 Schultz & Dupont, supra note 17, at 1157. 
 95 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 75. 
 96 See LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 476 (providing an excerpt from Secretary Hull’s letter to 
the Mexican Ambassador to the United States dated July 21, 1938). Indeed, Hull indicated that: 
“We cannot question the right of a foreign government to treat its own national in this fashion if it 
so desires. This is a matter of domestic concern.” See id. (meaning foreign governments can ex-
propriate without following Hull’s standard). 
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which is far from a holistic approach to human development. The next Sec-
tion expands on this notion. 
B. Property Rights in International Investment Agreements  
and Arbitral Awards 
There are two main issues to discuss regarding property rights in IIAs. 
The first refers to the notion of “property” itself, which, in these agree-
ments, is understood to be “investments.” The second is related to the sub-
stantive provisions of protection. These distinctions are significant because 
if parallels between ISA tribunals and human rights courts are to survive, 
there must be sufficient overlap in the approaches in these two areas. In this 
Section, I compare and contrast the concept of “investment” in some IIAs 
with that of property in human rights documents.97 I then analyze the pro-
tection offered in IIAs, and compare that with the sort of protection that 
human rights instruments offer.98 
1. Investment-Backed Expectations as Property 
The definition of “investment” is important because it is the damage to 
an investment that creates potential grounds for a claim. Of course, it is not 
the only parameter, but without an investment covered under the IIA there is 
not much that an arbitral tribunal can do, even if there are other types of 
harms. There are two main approaches to the definition of investment in 
IIAs: enterprise-based and asset-based. The enterprise-based approach is the 
most aligned with the traditional notion of foreign direct investment.99 The 
asset-based approach, however, is used more often in IIAs, and is the most 
open-ended.100 As explained below, however, these definitions are more 
theoretical than categorical. NAFTA’s Chapter 11 definition of investment is 
mostly enterprise-based, but it also encompasses other economic inter-
ests.101 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 113–157 and accompanying text. 
 99 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Scope and Definition: UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 22–23 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/
Docs/diaeia20102_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/84T2-4SLC] [hereinafter UNCTAD Series] (explaining 
the origins of the enterprise-based approach and noting that it limits investment to direct investment). 
 100 Engela C. Schlemmer, Investment, Investors, Nationality, and Shareholders, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 55–56 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2013); UNCTAD Series, supra note 99, at 21. 
 101 For instance, acquired property used or expected to be used for “economic benefit or other 
business purposes.” See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 53, at 646 (stating in Article 1139, subsection 
(g), that the term investment includes “real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, ac-
quired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes”). 
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Generally, then, most economic interests, backed by an infuse of mon-
ey, can be considered an investment. For instance, in the recent cases Bilcon 
of Delaware v. Government of Canada (“Bilcon Award”) and Bear Creek 
Mining Corp. v. Republic of Perú (“Bear Creek Award”), the mere expenses 
to secure the rights to operate were considered investments by arbitral tri-
bunals.102 Both cases involved the extracting industry, and in neither case 
did the enterprise actually operate, but instead there was an expectation that 
it would, and that the money spent towards that goal was considered an in-
vestment.103 A good rule of thumb is that most expenditures by a foreign 
investor—with the goal of receiving some sort of return—can be considered 
an investment.104 ISA tribunals protect this expectation of outcomes regard-
ing the investment by invoking the concept of “legitimate expectations.”105 
It is this feature of the treaty-based protection of investments that distin-
guishes it from property rights as human rights. 
This development has been considered an “investment-as-value” ap-
proach, as opposed to tribunals considering an “investment-as-property” 
approach.106 The main distinction is that in the investment-as-value ap-
proach a breach of an investment-backed expectation could be expropriated, 
whereas in an investment-as-property approach it could only constitute a 
breach of the FET.107 The case of Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of 
Canada can be considered an example of the investment-as-value approach 
because it considered access to the market as a “property interest.”108 The 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Perú, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 
¶¶ 284–285 (Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Bear Creek Award]; Bilcon of Del. v. Government of 
Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 346–351 
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 103 See Bear Creek Award, supra note 102, ¶¶ 284–285 (concluding that the Claimant was an 
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 104 Zachary Douglas phrased it this way: “The economic materialization of an investment 
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the assumption of risk in expectation of commercial return.” ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 189 (2009). 
 105 See Ratner, supra note 16, at 511 (listing “legitimate expectations” as one of the elements 
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 106 Douglas, supra note 105, at 377. 
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 108 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, ¶¶ 81–86 (June 26, 
2000); Douglas, supra note 105, at 376–77. 
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Bear Creek Award is a more recent example where the tribunal considered 
that “an economic impact” on “investment-backed expectations” can be 
considered an indirect expropriation, and thus, potentially also “proper-
ty.”109 Both NAFTA and the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the 
Republic of Peru have enterprise-based definitions of investment, which 
were supposed to be more restrictive in defining what would qualify as an 
investment.110 These cases show how these conceptual distinctions are not 
always helpful.  
As explained previously, those who see the treaty-based regime of in-
vestment protection as having human rights qualities—or as a proto-human 
rights regime—see a straight line from the MST to present day IIAs. ISA 
claims, however, now rarely deal with expropriations of assets in the tradi-
tional sense.111 Modern claims mostly deal with the protection of invest-
ment-backed expectations damaged by regulations or other domestic ordi-
nances.112 These developments have pushed the protection of “property” to 
uncharted territory, which is a long way from the customary norms of pro-
tection of aliens. 
2. Property and Expectations in Human Rights Courts 
The concept of legitimate expectations is not foreign in human rights 
courts. Furthermore, economic interests can be human rights to the extent 
that they are considered property as well. We know, however, that there is 
no single approach to protecting property rights. Some countries offer more 
protections than others do.113 International human rights treaties, when they 
do consider property rights as human rights, also come with limitations.114 
There is still no consensus regarding whether customary international law 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Bear Creek Award, supra note 102, ¶ 415. 
 110 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru, Can.–Peru, art. 847, 
May 29, 2008; NAFTA, supra note 53, at 1139.  
 111 BONNITCHA ET AL., POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 12, at 3. According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), of the known sixty-five ISA cases in 
2017, only five were related to takeovers, seizures or nationalizations of investments. UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2018: INVEST-
MENT AND NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 92–93, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CN2F-BCVF]. 
 112 For instance, from 1987 to July 2017 claimants argued a breach of the FET clause in 80% 
of the known cases, followed by indirect expropriation in 75% of known cases. Direct expropria-
tion was the least alleged breach. UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Facts and Figures, IIA Issues Note No. 3, 5–6 (Nov. 2017), http://unctad.org/en/Publications
Library/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U9E-FB3H]. 
 113 Jeff Waincymer, Balancing Property Rights in Expropriation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 58, at 275, 277–78. 
 114 Id. at 279. 
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protects property rights.115 This Section, thus, only analyzes the strength of 
the parallelisms between the concept of property as used in some human 
rights and ISA cases. 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights covers “the 
right to own property” and the arbitrary deprivation of property.116 Most 
human rights courts, however, tend to be regional and apply their own re-
spective treaties. Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Freedoms, for instance, protects “the peaceful 
enjoyment” of possessions, and also contains a prohibition against depriva-
tion of possessions “except in the public interest and subject to the condi-
tions provided by law and general principles of international law.”117 The 
Article goes on to emphasize that such protection should not be interpreted 
as restricting the state’s right to issue laws “to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties.”118 Article 21 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (“ACHR”) also protects the enjoyment of property and 
contemplates compensation according to “the forms established by law.”119 
One author has argued that most case law on property rights has come 
from the ECtHR, which influences how this topic is approached in ISA tri-
bunals.120 In a study made for the Council of Europe, Laurent Sermet ar-
gued that the ECtHR recognizes four levels of protection afforded by Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol No. 1: peaceful enjoyment of property, conditions for the 
deprivation of property, the prerogative of states to use property in the pub-
lic interest, and interference with property rights to obtain certain types of 
payment.121 These are protections offered to both the state and the individu-
al. Crucially, the ECtHR also recognizes legitimate expectations as property 
in certain circumstances. The ECtHR interprets legitimate expectations ac-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Valentina Sara Vadi, Through the Looking-Glass: International Investment Law through 
the Lens of a Property Theory, 8 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 22, 26–27 (2011). 
 116 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) 
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doms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.  
 118 Id. 
 119 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” art. 21, Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter ACHR]. 
 120 Kriebaum, supra note 77, at 47 (stating that most of the cases regarding individual protec-
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the European Convention on Human Rights, and noting that case law from the European Court of 
Human Rights is usually used for comparison in human rights law and investment law). 
 121 LAURENT SERMET, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 8 (1992), http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-11
(1998).pdf [https://perma.cc/5RR4-Q76V]. 
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cording to the domestic legal framework involved. Where domestic rules do 
not find legitimate expectations, the ECtHR usually does not either.122 Ad-
ditionally, legitimate expectations as property refers to frustrated future 
gains resulting from government interference, and not just any expectation 
of treatment.123 Many arbitral tribunals, in contrast, see legitimate expecta-
tions as a general rule of international law which can potentially cover any 
type of regulation or action by a government’s administrative body.124 
The ECtHR approach has been criticized for not being in line with the 
values of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) given its 
emphasis on the economic aspects of property rights.125 Furthermore, not 
every region protects property rights equally, and there is no universal ap-
proach to human rights.126 For instance, although there are similarities be-
tween the ECHR, the American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San 
Jose, Costa Rica” (“ACHR”), and the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ple’s Rights (“ACHPR”), the latter does not require compensation after ex-
propriation.127 Even within the ACHR, Argentina introduced the following 
reservation to Article 21: 
The Argentine Government establishes that questions relating to 
the Government’s economic policy shall not be subject to review 
by an international tribunal. Neither shall it consider reviewable 
anything the national courts may determine to be matters of ‘pub-
lic utility’ and ‘social interest’, nor anything they may understand 
to be ‘fair compensation’.128 
Although the ECtHR has determined that the Protocol recognizes the right 
of property “in substance,” it is also true that it has not enshrined an unqual-
ified right to acquire property.129 When it comes to the enjoyment of proper-
                                                                                                                           
 122 The court has found legitimate expectations to constitute property when it derives from the 
concept of possessions. Id. at 17. 
 123 Id. at 13–17. 
 124 Zeyl, supra note 105, at 208. 
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ty, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 1 as requiring a “fair balance” ap-
proach to the protection of property rights in which the court takes into ac-
count the aims pursued by the government.130 Importantly, when it comes to 
interference with property rights, the ECtHR shows a great deal of defer-
ence to what the government considers to be in the best interest of their citi-
zens unless the measure is clearly divorced from its aims.131 This is in con-
trast to what happens in ISA, where the fact that there could have been oth-
er alternatives to the measures taken potentially breaches the IIA.132 
As mentioned previously, the ACHR also recognizes the right to prop-
erty with limitations very similar to those discussed in the ECHR. The 
ACHR, similar to the ECHR, uses the phrase “the right to the use and en-
joyment of his property,” rather than a right to acquire property per se.133 
The ACHPR, for its part, is the most direct treaty in clearly stating that 
“[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed.”134 A crucial difference, how-
ever, is that it does not guarantee compensation and refers the issue back to 
domestic legislation.135 Lorenzo Cotula argues that this means that the 
ACHPR offers significantly lower protection than the ACHR and the 
ECHR.136 It is, however, not entirely clear that the problem is the wording 
in the ACHPR. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
has determined that the right to property “includes a right to have access to 
property of one’s own and the right not for one’s property to be re-
moved.”137 Furthermore, the ACHR, which does explicitly mention com-
pensation after expropriation, does so by clarifying that it should be done 
“in the cases and according to the forms established by law.”138 It is true, 
                                                                                                                           
 130 SCHABAS, supra note 129, at 972. 
 131 Id. at 975. 
 132 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 348–
350 (Sept. 18, 2007) (noting that in the determination as to whether Argentina could use the state 
of necessity defense, the Tribunal second-guessed the Argentinean government’s assessment of 
the severity of the economic crisis and questioned whether the government actions were the only 
options available). 
 133 ACHR, supra note 119, art. 21 
 134 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights “the Banjul Charter,” art. 14, June 27, 
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58. 
 135 See id. (noting that the right to property may only be “encroached upon” for public interest 
and “in accordance with provision of the appropriate laws”).  
 136 Cotula, supra note 51, at 70. 
 137 Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria, Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96, Deci-
sion, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H. P.R.], ¶ 77 (Oct. 1998), http://case
law.ihrda.org/doc/105.93-128.94-130.94-152.96/ [https://perma.cc/3RK2-5CWS]. 
 138 ACHR, supra note 119, art. 21(2). 
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though, that there is not enough human rights case law that clearly estab-
lishes the contours of property rights in Africa.139 
In contrast, a case from Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“IACHR”) did identify what was encompassed by the concept of property. 
In the Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru case, the court determined that property: 
“may be defined as those material objects that may be appropriated, and 
also any right that may form part of a person’s patrimony; this concept in-
cludes all movable and immovable property, corporal and incorporeal ele-
ments, and any other intangible object of any value.”140 IACHR cases are 
mostly related to the property rights of indigenous populations. In the Itu-
ango Massacres v. Colombia, the IACHR established that the Colombian 
army was complicit with a paramilitary group that attacked the community 
of El Aro in the municipality of Ituango.141 The paramilitary group mur-
dered several members of the community, destroyed houses, and stole live-
stock, some of which, according to the IACHR, was acquired by members 
of the military.142 In its judgment, the IACHR noted the importance of the 
stolen livestock for the existence of the community itself.143 Furthermore, 
the IACH recognized that the destruction of houses also related to other 
rights, such as the right to privacy, and was an important site for human 
dignity.144 
The IACHR is unequivocal in its position that the right to property is a 
fundamental human right that interlinks several other rights.145 The Ituango 
Massacres case is just one of several cases in which the IACHR interpreted 
the right to property as essential for the well-being and dignity of distinct 
communities, and in particular for indigenous populations.146 In Saramaka 
People v. Surinme, the IACHR equally considered land as more than just 
property, but also as a “safeguard [to] their physical and cultural surviv-
al.”147 There was a similar consideration in previous cases such as Mayagna 
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(Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v. Nicaragua, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, and, more recently, in the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, in which the court found that the effects on cultural 
identity by the lack of access of the members of the Xákmok Kásek to their 
territory was a violation of the right to property contemplated in Article 21.148 
This is not to say that the IACHR only protects indigenous land when 
it comes to the right to property. For instance, in the Barrios Family v. Vene-
zuela case the court found that police agents stealing several personal items 
during a search, and setting fire to part of the residence of the victim, con-
stituted violations to the right to property.149 Contrast this and the above 
cases to the Bilcon Award where the Tribunal found that the procedure fol-
lowed by a technical committee in charge of evaluating the environmental 
impact of a quarry was in breach of the MST, because it did not follow the 
expectations of the foreign investor.150 In human rights courts, even the in-
corporation of legitimate expectations as property protects the conditions 
necessary for the effective use of property.151 It is in this context where le-
gitimate expectations are part of human rights, they were never supposed to 
protect against any disappointment.152 
The purpose of this Essay is not to define what should properly be 
considered property, but rather to consider whether property rights should 
always be considered human rights. In this regard, Tim Hayward’s distinc-
tions are important to keep in mind. Hayward has described two justifica-
tions to consider property rights as human rights: (1) property rights as re-
lating to well-being and dignity, and (2) property rights as reflective of 
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equality.153 That is, property rights are human rights to the extent that a per-
son is entitled to the same rights as everyone else. Outside of these two jus-
tifications, Hayward finds that property rights are quite distinct from human 
rights. First, they are not “unconditional”, by which he meant that property 
rights are highly contextual.154 Second, property rights are not imprescripti-
ble, although human rights are.155 This means that property rights can be 
altered or destroyed without violating the human rights of the holder.156 
The distinction between the different systems of property rights be-
comes clearer in domestic legal frameworks. Property rights are always 
contextual and responsive to the historical circumstances that each country 
goes through, whereas the treaty-based regime of foreign investment was 
designed to do the opposite: to de-contextualize property rights under the 
guise of applying universal principles of international law that have never 
really fit the regime. Even the Factory at Chorzów Case (Ger. v. Pol.)—
often invoked to justify certain requirements for compensation—was issued 
in such particular circumstances that cannot be easily transplanted to ISA 
awards.157 But once this narrative took hold, it was not surprising to start 
seeing comparisons between the work done by arbitral tribunals with that of 
human rights courts. Comparing the two systems, however, leads to the odd 
conclusion that cases of extreme violence and arbitrariness in the depriva-
tion of property are the same—or at least similar—to cases where there is a 
disagreement regarding the decision of a technical committee. Both could 
certainly be wrong, but comparing them diminishes the relevance of human 
rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
These findings may explain why arbitral tribunals approach the issue 
of human rights with much more trepidation than commentators. The man-
date in IIAs has traditionally been a narrow one: resolve a dispute before 
the parties where the main issue is a monetary dispute—sometimes regard-
ing an expropriation, but not necessarily. Principles of international law 
have fit awkwardly within this framework. Some of these principles were 
never really accepted by developing countries, some were too vague, and 
some emerged and were applied in situations radically different from in-
vestment disputes. Arbitral tribunals were tasked with resolving all these 
conflicts in addition to the dispute before them. It is not surprising that these 
efforts quickly became controversial. Regarding whether property rights are 
human rights, the main concern has always been to empower every person 
to own and enjoy their property in equal standing with the rest of the popu-
lation. A regime of exception could not be further from this goal. 
